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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship of the openness and the impact of institutional reforms 
in the participation of the product of individual countries in global output. Therefore, it is based on economic simulations, 
a type of alternative approach that uses mathematical techniques and deductions to solve an objective model. The 
economic simulation of this work reflects that the trade opening level is an important factor of weight for possible 
institutional alterations in the economies. It is noticeable that, in the countries with low opening level, the cost of the 
capital is the main setback for the economic growth. And, in those economies with high opening level, the largest 
dynamics would compensate the problems caused by the cost of the capital. When compared the two types of reforms 
(continuous versus punctual), the "continuous" reform  will bring a more expressive gain quality of the relative product 
than the "punctual" reform.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a dominant perception that institutions are key for explaining the perennial technical 
progress, which gained a prominent role for explaining the large differences in output per capta among 
countries (Easterly and Levine, 2002; Barro, 1998; Ranis and Stewart, 2001). There is also a growing 
perception that we should examine the process of economic growth, its basis and its effects, taking into 
account the economic interpendence among countries (Helpman, 2004; Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002).  
 
We examine the relationship between trade openness and the institutional quality upon countries’ 
growth performance by working out some economic simulations based on Acemoglu and Ventura’s (2002) 
growth model. In the present case, the numerical computational analysis, which have some advantages over 
the traditional comparative statistics, will enable us to work out interesting economic scenarios involving 
changes in trade liberalization and institutional reforms.  
 
 Institutions are, here, considered in a broad sense. No doubt, properties rights and the rule of law are 
crucial features for reducing the risks to investors, that is, for granting good contracts and enforcing them 
(Easterly and Levine, 2002). The same applies to the existence of undistorted prices for preventing 
misalocation of domestic resources and promoting market competition, (Helpman, 2004; North, 1990; Barro, 
1998). Yet, despite the prominent role of sound microeconomic foundation over macroeconomic ones1, in the 
long run, we should include the latter in a broad notion of institutional quality. That is why we rather use the 
concept of Institutional barrier, as better explained in the paper.  
 
            Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) consists of a global economy where countries trade intermediate goods 
based on Ricardian characteristics (differences in productivity) and the quality of institutions create conditions 
for sustained economic growth. Economic simulations enable us to better track behaviors of certain variables, 
and the main impact analysis are divided, in the present analysis, into two main groups: the first involving 
economies A (developed economy) and B (economy in the progressive development) and the second 
involving economies B and C (economy in the stagnant developing). These two main groups are further 
divided into four tests per group, in which changes in the variable “Institutional Barrier” (see section 1) and 
the level of trade openness are tested. All the simulations of the economic model will be rotated in Matlab, 
using the SOR iterative numerical method. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured into three parts. Section one presents the formulation of the 
economic model. The second section presents the economic simulations and their results. Finally, we 
conclude. 
 
2. Structure of the Economic Model 
We take Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) model for reference, which consists of an imperfectly 
 
 
1 Even episodes of a general macroeconomic statibity among developing countries, which Rodrik (1999) assigns to external shocks 
amplified by delayed (domestic) stabilization policies, were found out to be better explained by delayed reforms (Cinquetti and Silva, 
2008).  
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competitive Ricardian model where international trade is restricted to intermediate goods. Domestic and 
foreign products are imperfect substitutes, but their market power is limited to the prices of exported goods, 
not extending to imported goods, since they would be small in the world economy. The consequent negative 
demand Otherwise, countries would face flat demand and the accumulation of capital would not affect the 
terms of trade. That is what makes constant returns to scale compatible with diminishing returns, as 
consequence of economic growth, or else how international trade grants a stable distribution of world income. 
In addition, this model consists of a global economy where countries differences in productivity or 
technology. These countries are able to influence the prices of goods they export but not those of imported 
goods. 
 
In this sense, some level of specialization in production is essential in order to support the 
assumptions about the effects on the exchange relationships emphasized here, namely if domestic and foreign 
products were perfect substitutes, Thus, it seems plausible that countries specialize in certain types of 
products.  
 
In order to describe the model we use an AK2, model to demonstrate how economic reforms and 
efficient policies improve trade among countries. Thus, countries that have carried out the necessary reforms 
have a greater capacity for economic growth than do those who have not. In addition, countries that adopt 
“irresponsible” economic policies generate unstable growth (Gries and Meierrieksy, 2010; Commander and 
Nikoloski, 2010; Aisen and Veiga, 2011; Dias and Tebaldi, 2011). 
 
2.1. Institutional Barriers 
The variable “Institutional Barrier” proposed in this paper has aim to denominating and expressing 
mathematically a variable related to the institutional quality of countries, as proposed by Acemoglu (2009). 
This allows countries to have different levels of productivity because of different technologies and economic 
policies.  
 
The mathematical formulation of this variable is based on equations Wavelet, and this type of 
equation is generally used in signal analysis. The purpose of using this formulation is to produce an amplitude 
component and another component related to a temporal movement. 
 
We can then mathematically express it as follows: 
 
 
2 The AK model is an endogenous growth model, and its name originates from the mathematical representation of the Cobb–Douglas 
production function:  
aa LAKY  1  
 
where Y represents the total output of the economy, A represents TFP, K is capital, L is work, and the parameter measures the elasticity 
of output to capital. To display constant returns to scale, we have the special case in which the production function becomes linear to 
capital. Thus, in this case, the Cobb–Douglas function takes the following form:  
AKY   
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and  
 
Thus, we consider the “Institutional Barrier” variable to be:    tj[  f (macroeconomic stability3 and core microeconomic foundations4) 
 
where  tr basj  is the basic interest rate of economy j;  tG j  is government expenditure in the economy j;  tTj  is 
government revenue in economy j; t  is the period, 321 ,, EEE  are the sensitivity parameters of the “Institutional 
Barrier” variable with regard to monetary, fiscal, and the microeconomic foundations of economy j; A  is the 
history of the “Institutional Barrier” variable in economy j until time t = 0 (this parameter is what determines 
the initial position of economy j at the beginning of the study); and  tjT  are the microeconomic foundations 
of economy j. Besides, it is appropriate to comment on the variables located within the brackets of equation 
(1): those on the left  represent macroeconomic stability (the monetary and fiscal 
policies of country j) and those on the right  represent the conditions of the microeconomic 
foundations of country j. As a result, high values for the basic interest rate, lack of public finances, and 
microeconomic distortions cause a relatively high value for the “Institutional Barrier” variable, which would 
hinder economic development. 
 
2.2. Solution of the Global Economy 
The complete characterization of the world distribution of income in steady state is given by the 
following pair of equations:  
 
The cost of capital5 of country j: 
 
                                                   > @ jgr jjj WU[ 1**                           (2) 
 
where *jr  is the cost of capital, j[  is the “Institutional Barrier,” jU  is the discount rate, *g  is the rate of 
growth of global output, and jW  is the openness of the economy. Thus, the higher the “Institutional Barrier,” 
the higher the discount rate, and the lower the trade openness of country j, the higher is its cost of capital. 
 
 
 
3 For more details: (Borio, 2011; Gerry, Lee and Mickiewicz, 2010; Satyanath and Subramanian, 2004; Ocampo, 2005). 
 
4 In this paper, the core microeconomic foundations are productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, and property rights. 
 
 
5  Acemoglu (2009),  pg 668, says: “Our assumption that each country is small implies that each exports practically all of its production 
of intermediates and imports the ideal basket of intermediates form the world economy. Consequently    trtp jj   is not only the 
price of intermediates produced by country j but also its terms of trade – defined as the price of the exports of a country divided by the 
price of its imports”.       
   tTtGtr jjbasj .. 21 EE   tjTE .3
0,, 321 !EEE
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And the equation for the relative products of country j: 
 > @ j jgy jjjj WHU[P  1**                     (3) 
                                                              
   tYtYy jj {*   
where  tY j  represents the products of country j and  tY  represents the products worldwide. 
 
Equation (3) shows that countries that have better levels of technology (high jP ), lower 
“Institutional Barrier” values (low ), and lower discount rates (low jU ) are relatively wealthier. It also 
points out that the elasticity of output with respect to  and jU  depends on the elasticity of substitution 
among intermediate goods, jH , and the level of openness, jW . 
 
3. Structure of the Economic Model 
The economic model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) demonstrates that the trade openness and 
institutional barriers are relevant for economic growth. Even so, analysis of the impact of these variables on 
the product of countries requires a numerical sense. For this purpose, we use a numerical simulation in order 
to test changes in these two variables. 
 
The model has 11 structural parameters and two main equations. In order to calculate the dynamic 
trajectories of the endogenous variables of the system we must first set the values of structural parameters. To 
do so, we assign them numerical values that can be found in real-world economies without oversimplifying 
the simulation process. Specifically, we consider for the countries of the simulation: (i) that the variables 
related to macroeconomic stability do not interfere in the products of any of the economies         0  tTtGtr jjbasj ; (ii) a global growth rate in steady state ( *g ) of 2% per period; (iii) an 
elasticity of substitution among the  intermediate  goods in country j  and the rest  of the world ( ) at a value 
of 26;  (iv) an indicator of the relative weights of the products of the countries ( ) equal to 17; and (v) 
discount rates ( jU ) of 0,7, 0,75, and 0,8 for economies A, B, and C, respectively. The other parameters j[ , 
jT , and jW  are variable parameters, which are the objects tested in the simulation. We also include 
parameters used in numerical modeling (tol and number of iterations). 
 
In order to present the simulation results, the tests were divided into two main groups: the first 
involving economies A and B and the second involving economies B and C. These two groups were divided 
 
 
6 The purpose of using the value of 2 for jH  is not based on any microeconomic assumption, beyond  the  supposition  of  Acemoglu  
and  Ventura  (2002)  that   1!H   in  order  to    avoid  “immiserizing growth.” Thus, the value used here is 2 H  in order to 
facilitate the simulation, because equation (3) has the exponent 
¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
W
H1 , and thus, in the simulation, this would be 
¹¸
·
©¨
§ W
1 . 
 
 
7 The values jH  and jP  were kept constant for all countries in order to simplify the simulation. In this way, all countries present the 
same preferences between domestic and imported goods, and related products have the same weight (even technological advances). 
j[
j[
jH
jP
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into four tests per group, in which changes were tested in “Institutional Barrier” and the level of trade 
openness. The parameters of economy B were the same in all tests: 75,0 BU ; 35,0 BW ; and 
35,0 BT . It is worth noting that this economy had already carried out strong institutional reforms. The 
discount rates of the other two economies (A and C) were also constant during all tests, with values of 
70,0 AU  and 80,0 CU .  
3.1. Tests performed in the simulation of the economic model 
The two equations presented in section 1 were run in Matlab using the parameters described above 
for a time horizon of 20 periods. In order to solve the linear system of this simulation it is necessary to find 
the inverse of the matrix containing the terms of the trade of the economies; however, this is a task somewhat 
complicated using direct methods. Thus, it was necessary to use an iterative numerical method to calculate 
successive approximations to the solution of the system. We chose the SOR Method (Succesive Over 
Relaxation) using a maximum number of iterations, an initial approach, and a tolerance for convergence 
(Judd, 1998). should be added at the end of the paper, and its corresponding citation will be added in the order 
of their appearance in the text. Authors should ensure that every reference in the text appears in the list of 
references and vice versa. Indicate references by Clark et al., 1962 or Deal and Grove, 2009 or Fachinger, 
2006 in the text. The actual authors can be referred to, but the reference citation(s) must always be given. 
 
3.1.1 Description of the test procedures of the simulation of the economic model 
 
 The two equations presented in section 1 were run in Matlab using the parameters described above 
for a time horizon of 20 periods. In order to solve the linear system of this simulation it is necessary to find 
the inverse of the matrix containing the terms of the trade of the economies; however, this is a task somewhat 
complicated using direct methods. Thus, it was necessary to use an iterative numerical method to calculate 
successive approximations to the solution of the system. We chose the SOR Method (Succesive Over 
Relaxation) using a maximum number of iterations, an initial approach, and a tolerance for convergence 
(Judd, 1998). 
3.2. Simulation results 
The last three paragraphs were used to present the tests used in the simulation of the economic model, 
whereas here, the aim is to discuss the results of these tests. Thus, this item is divided into two sub-items: the 
first discusses the results obtained by the trade openness of countries, and the second discusses the dynamic 
behavior of the "Institutional Barrier". 
 
3.2.1 Dynamic behavior of the level of opening of the countries, : 
 
 The first parameter tested was the level of openness of the three economies. Figure 1 displays the 
results of this test. As mentioned, economy A had low quality before carrying out institutional reforms in 
period 11. Thereafter there was a recovery in the products for this economy. Note, however, that this change 
was mild (1,78% gain in the product relative to economy A). This feature is explained by the low value of the 
level of trade openness of this economy, 35,0 AW . This is corroborated by comparing Figures 1 and 2: it is 
clear that the effects of test 2 show a greater intensity than those presented in test 1 (in the second test, the 
gain in the products in the economy A is 13,31%). This behavior is also seen in comparisons of tests 3 and 4 
(Figures 3 and 4), 5 and 6 (Figures 5 and 6), and 7 and 8 (Figures 7 and 8). In this second group of tests on 
jW
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economies B and C, the gain in intensity by increasing the level of openness is even greater than that 
presented by economies A and B, and the gain in economy C in test 5 is 2,71%, whereas in test 6, it is 
22,36%. These results corroborate the work of: Federici and Montalbano, 2009; Haddad,  Lim and 
Saborowski, 2010; Székely and Sámano, 2012; and Binici, Cheyng and Lai, 2012. 
 
 
                      
   Figure 1 – Results of relative products obtained from test 1.                      Figure 2 – Results of relative products obtained from test 2.  
                        
  Figure 3 – Results of relative product obtained from test 3.                        Figure 4 – Results of relative products obtained by test 4.  
 
 
                        
  Figure 5 – Results of relative products obtained from test 5.                      Figure 6 – Results of relative products obtained from test 6.  
 
One explanation for this large difference in value caused by the level of trade openness is presented 
in the figures that show the results for the cost of capital (Figures 9–12 for economies A and B and Figures 
13–16 for economies B and C). We note that the cost of capital is the major impediment to economic 
development in the tests that have a low level of trade openness (Figures 9, 11, 13, and 15), whereas in the 
other tests, the most dynamic caused by the greater level of openness makes the "Institutional Barrier" factor 
relevant to the changes in relative productivity. Therefore, a very open economy that carries out institutional 
reforms will display more significant gains than a relatively closed economy. Thus, level of openness is a 
measure of the weight of changes that occur in a given country. This implies that a country that has relatively 
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greater openness will suffer more during crises and will benefit more in times of prosperity. 
 
                     
  Figure 7 – Results of relative products obtained from test 7.                     Figure 8 – Results of relative products obtained from test 8. 
 
 
                     
   Figure 9 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 1.                Figure 10 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 2.  
 
                      
   Figure 11 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 3.                Figure 12 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 4.  
 
                    
   Figure 13 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 5.                Figure 14 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 6.  
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  Figure 15 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 7.                 Figure 16 – Results of the cost of capital obtained from test 8.  
 
 
3.2.2 The dynamic behavior of the “Institutional Barrier” variable of countries, j[ : 
 
 The second test focuses on the behavior of “Institutional Barrier.” As mentioned above, we carried 
out two types of reforms, namely “punctual” reforms that maintain the same value of jT in the post-reform 
period until the end of the test and “continuous” reforms in which the institutional quality of the economy in 
question increases each period. Note, by comparing the test 2 (Figure 2) with the test 6 (Figure 6), that the 
reform "continuous" will gain a more expressive quality of the relative product on the reform “punctual". 
Another highlight is the fact that in tests with low level of trade openness (Figures 1, 3, 5 and 7), the economy 
with lower quality institutional do not require reforms intense and urgent, because even on losing product, this 
loss is softer than if it had a greater level of openness. Thus, economies that have greater trade openness 
should be more concerned about the quality of their institutions, because this causes the greatest potential for 
greater openness. In summary, economies that have low levels of trade openness have lower perceptions of 
poor institutional quality, whereas economies that have high levels of trade openness, if they suffer quality 
loss in their institutions, should seek to carry out urgent institutional reforms or face deteriorating economies 
over time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to discuss the relationship of the openness and the impact of 
institutional reforms in the participation of the product of individual countries in global output. The first test 
scenario would be a reform “punctual” keeping the same value of the post-reform until the end of the test; a 
second test would be a reform scenario "continuous", in which, each period, increases the quality of 
institutional economics in question.  
 
 The simulated trajectories showed that the level of trade openness is an important factor that affects 
institutional changes in economies. We have shown that in countries that have low levels of openness, the cost 
of capital is the main obstacle to economic development, because they use relatively more domestic capital 
goods compared with intermediate goods in their production. Furthermore, economies that have high levels of 
trade openness, the greater dynamic offset the problems caused by the cost of capital. 
 
When comparing the two types of reforms, the reform "continuous" will gain a more expressive 
quality of the product on the reform of the "punctual”. Other conclusion is that the economies that have 
greater openness should be more concerned about the quality of their institutions, and economies with low 
80   Celso José Costa Junior /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  71 – 80 
level of trade openness, if its were with low institutional quality, there would be no need for reforms intense 
and urgent. 
 
 In this work the parameters were not estimated for any particular economy, however Costa Junior 
(2010) compares the results generated by simulation with a series of real data using USA  and South Korea´s 
informations, which corroborates the results of this study. Even so, it is noticed that a future empirical work 
on this subject is needed.  
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